A number of OECD countries experienced an environment of low interest rates and a rapid increase in real house prices and residential investment during the past decade. Different explanations have been suggested for the housing boom: expansionary monetary policy, capital inflows due to a global savings glut and excessive financial innovation combined with inappropriately lax financial regulation. In this study we examine the effects of these three factors on the housing market. We estimate a panel VAR for a sample of OECD countries and identify monetary policy and capital inflows shocks using sign restrictions. To explore how the effects of these shocks change with the structure of the mortgage market and the degree of securitization, we allow the VAR coefficients to vary with mortgage market characteristics. Our results suggest that both types of shocks have a significant and positive effect on real house prices, real credit to the private sector and residential investment. The response of housing variables to both types of shocks is stronger in countries with more developed mortgage markets. The amplification effect of mortgage-backed securitization is particularly strong for capital inflows shocks.
Introduction
The run-up to the recent global …nancial crisis was characterised by an environment of low interest rates and a rapid increase in housing market activity across OECD countries. The link between the two is intuitive: low interest rates make credit cheaper and increase the demand for housing.
Some scholars argue that expansionary monetary policy was responsible for the low level of interest rates and the subsequent house price boom -for example, Hume This negative correlation suggests the presence of an important link between the current account balance and the housing sector, but the direction of causality is unclear.
One other factor which is thought to have played a role in amplifying the e¤ect of interest rate movements on housing activity is …nancial innovation. In more developed mortgage markets, consumers have easier access to credit and tend to be more leveraged. In the presence of …nancial frictions, the impact of changes in interest rates on consumer wealth and the housing market should become stronger when leverage is higher. This is the idea behind the …nancial accelerator e¤ect developed by Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) . In addition to this e¤ect, there may also be ampli…cation through securitization. Diamond and Rajan (2009) argue that excessive securitization has led to a misallocation of capital to the real estate sector, exacerbating the e¤ect of interest rate movements on housing activity.
Each of these explanations has di¤erent policy implications. Should policy makers try to address external imbalances, increase …nancial regulation or redesign the monetary policy framework to prevent future boom and bust episodes in the housing market?
In this study we estimate a Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model for a panel of 18 OECD countries and look at the e¤ects of capital in ‡ows, monetary policy and …nancial innovation on the housing sector. Monetary policy and capital in ‡ows shocks are identi…ed using the sign restrictions approach developed by Canova and de Nicoló (2002) and Uhlig (2005) . We look at the e¤ect of both types of shocks on real credit to the private sector, real residential investment, and real house prices. We also assess whether the degree of mortgage market development or legislation permitting issuance of mortgage-backed securities amplify or dampen the impact of these shocks on the housing sector.
Previous work using VAR models to analyse the housing market has focused on the transmission of monetary policy shocks in advanced economies -for example, Assenmacher-Wesche and Goodhart and Ho¤mann (2008) .
At the same time, there is a substantial literature looking at the "capital in ‡ows problem" and its implication for asset prices in developing economies -for example, Calvo et al. (1994) but studies examining this link for advanced economies are still scarce. For example, Reinhart and Reinhart (2008) …nd that large capital in ‡ows in both advanced and emerging economies are associated with a real exchange rate appreciation and booms in equity and house prices. Similarly, Aizenman and Jinjarak (2009) document a negative relationship between current account balances and real house price growth in a broad sample of developed and developing countries, like the one displayed in Figure 1 for OECD countries.
Our paper brings together these two strands of literature, looking at the e¤ect of both capital in ‡ows and monetary policy shocks. In this respect, it is closest to Sá and Wieladek (2010) , who estimate an open-economy VAR model for the United States and use sign restrictions derived from a 2-country DSGE model to identify the e¤ect of both shocks on the housing market. They …nd that capital in ‡ows shocks explain a substantial amount of the variation in real house prices and residential investment in the United States. While Sá and Wieladek (2010) only focus on the United States, we look at a broader sample of all OECD countries.
Another contribution of this paper is to study the role of …nancial innovation in the transmission of monetary policy and capital in ‡ows shocks to the housing sector. We …rst separate our sample into a group of countries with high mortgage market development and a group of countries with low mortgage market development. Countries are classi…ed using an index constructed in IMF (2008) , which takes a higher value if typical loan-to-value ratios are high, there is the possibility of mortgage equity withdrawal (i.e. consumers can borrow against the value of their houses to …nance spending), secondary mortgage markets exist, and mortgage contracts are predominantly long term. We estimate our panel VAR model separately for these two groups of countries and compare their impulse responses following monetary policy and capital in ‡ows shocks.
To study how securitization a¤ects the transmission of capital in ‡ows and monetary policy shocks to the housing market we use a de jure index constructed by Ho¤man and Nitschka (2009) which captures the extent to which securitization is allowed in di¤erent countries. The index varies both across countries and across time. Splitting the sample into groups would neglect the time variation. To exploit the time variation in this index, we estimate an interacted panel VAR model, as in Towbin and Weber (2010) . By interacting all variables with an index of mortgagebacked securitization, we allow the responses to vary with the degree of securitization. We then compare impulse responses evaluated at high and low levels of securitization.
Some previous studies have looked at whether the structure of the mortgage market plays a role in the propagation of monetary policy shocks. Calza et al. (2009) and Assenmacher-Wesche and Gerlach (2010) …nd that higher mortgage market development ampli…es the e¤ects of monetary policy shocks on housing variables. Both studies estimate panel VAR models across two groups of countries, classi…ed according to their degree of mortgage market development using various crosssectional indicators. Our approach is similar to theirs, but di¤ers in three important ways. First, we identify the e¤ect of capital in ‡ows shocks in addition to monetary policy shocks. Second, we use sign restrictions rather than zero restrictions for identi…cation of the shocks. 1 Third, we estimate an interacted panel VAR which allows us to study the e¤ects of time-varying characteristics of the mortgage market without having to split the sample in sub-groups.
Our results suggest that both monetary policy and capital in ‡ows shocks have a signi…cant and positive e¤ect on house prices, credit to the private sector and residential investment. A reduction of 10 basis points on long term nominal interest rates caused by an expansionary monetary policy shock raises real credit and house prices by about 0:3% after ten quarters and real residential investment by about 0:2%. A similar reduction in long rates caused by a capital in ‡ows shock has a larger e¤ect, with the rise in real credit to the private sector and real house prices reaching a peak of about 0:5% after seven quarters. The response of real residential investment to capital in ‡ows shocks is quicker and more short-lived, peaking at 0:7% after two quarters.
The e¤ects of both shocks are greater in countries with a higher degree of mortgage market development. This suggests that excessive …nancial innovation may act as a propagation mechanism. The existence of mortgage-backed securities has a much larger e¤ect on the transmission of capital in ‡ows shocks. Legislation permitting the issuance of mortgage-backed securities increases the impact of capital in ‡ows shocks on real house prices, real residential investment and real credit to the private sector by a factor of two. This may be explained by the fact that securitization transforms illiquid, low-grade loans into publicly traded assets of higher quality which are attractive to foreign investors. In this way, securitization increases the share of foreign capital in ‡ows allocated to home mortgage loans, amplifying the e¤ect of capital in ‡ows on the domestic housing market.
Our results suggest that persistent capital in ‡ows, coupled with securitization, played a signi…cant role in the housing booms observed in some countries in the run-up to the …nancial crisis.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 looks at the literature on the transmission channels of interest rates to housing activity and discusses how …nancial innovation may amplify those channels. Section 3 discusses the methodology and data. The main results are presented in section 4 and various robustness checks in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Transmission Channels of Interest Rates to Housing Markets Bernanke and Gertler (1995) and Mishkin (2007) survey the literature on potential transmission channels between interest rates and the real economy. While their focus is on interest rate changes caused by monetary policy, the same channels would be in place for interest rate changes caused by capital in ‡ows. In a neoclassical world the user cost of capital is the only transmission channel: lower interest rates on bonds decrease the opportunity cost of buying a house and increase the demand for houses. In the presence of information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders or other types of …nancial frictions, there is an additional transmission channel -the …nancial accelerator e¤ ect, developed in the seminal papers of Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). Bernanke and Gertler (1989) focus on the investment decision of …rms. There is asymmetric information between lenders and entrepreneurs: while entrepreneurs know the pro…tability of their investment projects, lenders must pay an auditing cost to observe the project's return. This information asymmetry is the key source of persistence in the model. A negative real interest rate shock increases the pro…ts of entrepreneurs and lowers agency costs, making it easier for them to obtain external …nance. As a result, more investment projects are …nanced, which creates employment for young agents and leads to further income expansion in subsequent periods.
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) add an additional element to this story: the idea that the net worth of borrowers changes not only in response to variations in cash ‡ows, but also to changes in the value of their assets. In their framework agents can only borrow against collateral (for example, land) and the amount they can borrow depends on the value of collateral. The need for collateral in this model arises not because of asymmetric information but because of limited commitment, i.e. lenders cannot force borrowers to work in order to repay their debt. The dynamic interaction between the borrowing constraint and the value of collateral generates both persistence and ampli…cation. A temporary increase in interest rates reduces borrowers'net worth and tightens their credit constraint. Borrowers cut back on their investment expenditure (including investment in land) and their net worth next period falls as they earn less revenue. This is analogous to the persistence e¤ect in Bernanke and Gertler. But there is an additional e¤ect that operates through the price of land. To ensure market clearing, demand for land by lenders has to rise, which requires a reduction in the user cost of land (the di¤erence between that period's land price and the discounted value of the land price in the following period). The anticipated decline in user costs in subsequent periods leads to an even larger fall in the price of land in the current period, since the price of land equals the discounted value of future user costs. The fall in the price of land reduces net worth of borrowers in the current period even further and has a large impact on their investment spending since they are highly leveraged. There is an ampli…cation e¤ect that occurs because the price of land is forward looking and borrowers are highly leveraged.
The empirical relevance of the …nancial accelerator e¤ect has been studied, for example, in Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) . This study presents a dynamic general equilibrium model that incorporates both the persistence e¤ect in the original Bernanke and Gertler (1989) These studies predict that the transmission channels would be stronger in countries with more developed mortgage markets. Higher loan-to-value ratios reinforce the ampli…cation e¤ect described in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) as households are more leveraged and their net worth is more a¤ected by ‡uctuations in the value of collateral. The possibility of mortgage equity withdrawal (i.e., the possibility to borrow against the value of the house to …nance spending) should have a similar e¤ect. Countries where it is less costly to re…nance mortgages should also see stronger transmission from interest rates to housing activity, since interest rate reductions would feed through to lower mortgage rates not only for new mortgages but also for existing ones. This would lower the cost of credit and increase housing demand.
There is yet an additional channel through which interest rates may a¤ect house prices: the risk taking channel, proposed by Rajan (2005) and Borio and Zhu (2008) . According to this theory, low interest rates encourage …nancial intermediaries to take more risk, for example because they target a certain rate of return and need to take more risk to achieve that target when risk-free interest rates are lower (a search for yield e¤ect). This would lead to an increase in demand for riskier assets, driving up their prices. The underpricing of risk may also lead to more lenient lending standards, for example higher loan-to-value ratios or lending to households with higher default risk. This would increase borrowers'leverage and strengthen the ampli…cation e¤ect of changes in collateral values described above. Hence, there may be an interesting interaction between the risk taking channel and the …nancial accelerator.
Diamond and Rajan (2009) argue that securitization also plays an important role in the transmission of interest rate shocks to the housing market. Securitization allows banks to share risks by moving them o¤ their balance sheets. This leads to an increase in banks' risk appetite and strengthens the risk taking channel described above. To the extent that banks become more lenient in their lending standards, the …nancial accelerator e¤ect may be strengthened as well. By amplifying these transmission channels, securitization may play a role in propagating the e¤ects of interest rate reductions on housing activity. Diamond and Rajan also highlight that securitization facilitates foreign investment in mortgage loans. Without securitization, it is di¢ cult for foreign investors to hold home mortgage loans directly, because they are of uncertain credit quality and have a higher propensity to default than other assets. Securitization packages mortgages together and slices them in di¤erent levels of risk. The riskiest tranches can be bought by investors with higher risk appetite, while the AAA tranches can be sold to international investors. In this way, securitization increases the share of foreign capital in ‡ows allocated to home mortgage loans. This would suggest that securitization may have a particularly strong role in the transmission of capital in ‡ows shocks to the housing market, a conjecture which is supported by our empirical results.
Methodology

Data
We estimate an open economy VAR model for a panel of eighteen OECD countries. 2 The model includes twelve variables: the consumer price index, real consumption, real non-residential investment, short-term interest rates, long-term interest rates, the ratio of the current account balance to GDP, the trade-weighted real exchange rate, world GDP, world prices, real house prices, real credit to the private sector, and real residential investment. World variables are constructed using country-speci…c trade weights to account for di¤erent geographic exposures. They are included to control for the state of the global economy.
The …rst nine variables are included to help with identi…cation. The last three variables capture developments in the housing market. While mortgage credit would be preferable to total private credit, it is not available for the whole sample of countries.
The model includes both short-term and long-term interest rates. For the countries in our sample, short-term interest rates are largely controlled by central banks. Movements in nominal short-term interest rates are commonly used in VARs to identify monetary policy shocks. Longterm interest rates, on the other hand, tend to be driven by …nancial market outcomes. As a result, one would expect to observe the e¤ect of capital in ‡ows shocks on long-term rather than on short-term interest rates.
We follow a large literature in monetary economics -see, for example, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999) -and include all variables in levels. Apart from interest rates, all variables are in logs. 3 The data sources are the OECD Economic Outlook, the IMF International Financial Statistics 
Empirical Model
The model has the following reduced form representation:
where Y i;t is a q 1 vector of explanatory variables, C i is a q 1 vector of country-speci…c intercepts, A i;k is amatrix of autoregressive coe¢ cients up to lag L, and u it is the q 1 vector of one-step-ahead prediction errors, normally distributed with acovariance matrix . Indices i and t indicate that the coe¢ cients are allowed to vary across countries and time.
3 Canova (2005) suggests that, if there is uncertainty on whether the variables in the VAR are stationary, the best solution is to include potentially non-stationary variables in levels. Sims, Stock and Watson (1990) show that in the presence of non-stationarity OLS estimates are super-consistent. Sims (1988) shows that Bayesian inference with a standard Normal-Wishart prior is not a¤ected by non-stationarity. 4 Hannan Quinn and Schwarz Information Criteria suggest a lag length between one and two for individual countries. We follow Calza et al. (2009) and choose a lag length of two. We obtain similar results when using one or three lags instead.
It is useful to write the model in recursive form:
where J i is a lower triangularmatrix with ones on the main diagonal,C i = J i C i; ;Ã it;k = J i;t A it;k for k = 1; :::; L;ũ i = J i u i; and~ = J i;t it J 0 i;t is a diagonal matrix. By estimating the model in recursive form, we allow for variation in contemporaneous correlation of variables across countries.
Baseline Model
Using a panel rather than a single country framework increases the number of observations and leads to more precise estimates. However, transmission mechanisms are likely to vary across countries, for example due to di¤erences in institutional arrangements. We assume that both the intercept and slope coe¢ cients can vary across countries:
, where C and A k are the cross-sectional averages and " i;0 and " i;k capture country-speci…c variation. Pesaran and Smith (1995) show that the standard …xed e¤ects estimator, which only allows for heterogeneous intercepts but imposes homogeneous slopes, is inconsistent in dynamic panels if there is also slope heterogeneity. Applying the …xed e¤ects estimator leads to serial correlation in the residuals. A combination of serially correlated residuals and regressors will therefore lead to biased estimates. Pesaran and Smith (1995) propose the mean group estimator as a solution to this problem. We implement this estimator by interacting all variables with country dummies D i;k for i = 1; :::; N . This procedure amounts to a generalized version of the standard …xed e¤ects estimator that adds …xed e¤ects on the slope coe¢ cients in addition to …xed e¤ects on the intercepts. The interacted country dummies capture all country-speci…c time-invariant variation " i;k = D i;k . We begin our empirical analysis by looking at the impulse responses implied by the estimated average coe¢ cients, which can be interpreted as the responses of a typical OECD country.
3.2.2
Cross-sectional Heterogeneity in Mortgage Market Structure
As a next step we investigate the e¤ect of the mortgage market structure on the transmission of shocks. As documented in IMF (2008) there is substantial heterogeneity in mortgage market development across countries. While in Anglo-Saxon and Nordic countries deregulation of mortgage markets was relatively rapid and was completed by the mid-1980s, in Japan and continental Europe the process was more gradual.
In more developed mortgage markets consumers should have easier access to credit because of stronger competition and a greater variety of funding sources and loan products. We use the index constructed in IMF (2008) as a summary measure for a number of variables that characterize mortgage market development. The index takes a high value if typical loan-to-value ratios are high, there is the possibility of mortgage equity withdrawal (i.e. consumers can borrow against the value of their houses to …nance spending), households are able to re…nance their mortgages without paying fees, secondary mortgage markets exist, and mortgage contracts are predominantly longterm. Because of limited data availability the index is time-invariant and refers to the mid-2000s.
In the next section we adapt the model to look at the e¤ect of a time-varying measure of mortgage market structure.
We use this index to split countries into two groups: one group with highly developed mortgage markets (HDM) and another with less developed mortgage markets (LDM). 5 Figure 2 shows that the Anglo-Saxon and Nordic countries tend to have a highly developed mortgage market, whereas most countries in continental Europe are in the less developed group. 6 In the baseline analysis we work with the overall index. To assess the robustness of the results, we then look at some of its subcomponents, splitting countries according to the typical loan-to-value ratio and the possibility of mortgage equity withdrawal. As an alternative to the IMF index, we also split countries using the ratio of mortgage debt to GDP in 2004 taken from the tables in Calza et al (2009). The resulting country groups are listed in Table 2 .
Some of the indicators used to construct the mortgage market index, for example loan-tovalue ratios, tend to vary over the business cycle and are likely to respond to economic shocks.
This could be a problem for our approach, since we assume that mortgage market characteristics are structural factors and are invariant to the business cycle. Note, however, that our results use only cross-sectional variation, not time-series variation, and are therefore not subject to this critique. Other indicators, such as the possibility of mortgage equity withdrawal, are slow-moving institutional variables and are not likely to be a¤ected by business cycle ‡uctuations.
The e¤ect of time-invariant features of the mortgage market on the dynamics is fully captured by the country-speci…c variation " i;k in the VAR coe¢ cients. Let " i;k = mor i;k + i;k where mor i;k stands for the e¤ects of country speci…c variation in the mortgage market and i;k for other differences unrelated to the mortgage market. Because i;k has mean zero by assumption, the e¤ects of mortgage market development can then be estimated by computing the average coe¢ cient for the highly developed and the less developed markets separately:
We can interpret the impulse responses implied by the VAR coe¢ cient matricesÃ i;kHDM;k = A k + mor HDM;k andÃ i;kLDM;k = A k + mor LDM;k for k = 1; :::; L as the responses in a typical country with a more developed market and in a typical country with a less developed market.
Securitization and Time-varying Financial Structure
A major development in mortgage …nance in the past twenty …ve years has been the increased availability of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) through changes in legislation in a number of countries. Ho¤mann and Nitschka (2009) construct a qualitative de jure indicator for the degree securitization in the mortgage sector. 7 To exploit this variation we follow the approach of Towbin and Weber (2010) and augment the VAR with an interaction term. To estimate the e¤ect of securitization on the transmission mechanism we interact all variables with the securitization index and generalize our model to:
it;k Y i;t k +ũ it t = 1; :::T i = 1; :::; Nũ it~N (0;~ ) Italy, Japan, Belgium, and Norway securitization has not been introduced. 8 If securitization a¤ects the transmission of monetary policy shocks and capital in ‡ows shocks, we expect to see variation in the VAR coe¢ cients over time.
Identi…cation
We identify two types of shocks that lead to lower domestic interest rates: an expansionary monetary policy shock and a capital in ‡ows shock. The two shocks are identi…ed using the sign restrictions approach developed by Canova and de Nicoló (2002), Faust and Rogers (2003) , and Uhlig (2005) .
We can think of the one step ahead prediction error u t as a linear combination of orthonormal structural shocks u t = Bv t , with E(v 0 t v t ) = I. The only restriction on B comes from the covariance matrix of the prediction errors = E(u t u 0 t ) = E(Bv t v 0 t B 0 ) = BB 0 : This leaves many degrees of freedom in specifying B and further restrictions are necessary to achieve identi…cation. The challenge for structural VAR models is to …nd credible restrictions on B. Sign restrictions narrow down the set of acceptable B by restricting the sign of the impulse responses of a set of variables to a structural shock. Table 3 lists the sign restrictions used to identify capital in ‡ows and monetary policy shocks.
They are similar to the ones in Sá and Wieladek (2010) and rely on previous theoretical and empirical work. We do not impose any restrictions on the housing variables, which are our main variables of interest. Following Uhlig (2005) , the restrictions are imposed for four quarters after the shock.
Positive capital in ‡ows shocks lead to an increase in the current account de…cit, a decrease in the long term interest rate, an appreciation of the real exchange rate, and an increase in consumption and non-residential investment. The restrictions are consistent with the regularities of capital in ‡ow periods identi…ed in Reinhart and Reinhart (2008) . We understand a capital in ‡ows shock to be an unexpected increase in foreigners'demand for domestic assets.
Open economy models deliver a number of reasons why foreigners may increase their demand for domestic assets. For example, a global increase in savings would increase demand for assets in general and therefore also lower the domestic ex ante real interest rate. Domestic residents dissave and consume more, while investment rises, leading to a real exchange rate appreciation and a current account de…cit. Another possibility is a reshu-ing of foreigners'portfolios towards domestic assets as in Sá and Viani (2010) and Caballero et al. (2008) . Such a shift may happen because of changes in the portfolio preferences of foreign investors, foreign …nancial market structure or a domestic …nancial reform, all of which make it more attractive for foreigners to invest in domestic assets. Again, the portfolio shift towards domestic assets leads to a capital in ‡ow that …nances consumption and investment, lowers real domestic interest rates and appreciates the domestic currency. Finally, foreign monetary authorities may attempt to improve competitiveness through expansionary monetary policy. Low foreign interest rates make domestic assets more attractive, capital in ‡ows drive down the domestic real interest rate, and the real exchange rate appreciates.
Although the sources of these events are quite distinct, we argue that the consequences for the domestic economy and in particular the housing sector should be similar. In all cases, lower domestic real interest rates should lead to an expansion in domestic credit and spur housing activity.
We restrict the real long term interest rate rather than the nominal rate because real shifts in the total demand for domestic assets should a¤ect real returns. The restriction is on the long rate as opposed to the short rate because a broad class of models assumes that the central bank perfectly controls the short rate. In order to compute the ex ante real long term interest rate we need to subtract expected in ‡ation from the nominal rate. Our measure for expected in ‡ation is the VAR forecast. We implement the sign restriction on the real long rate by computing the response of the nominal long rate and the price level in a …rst step. We then use the response of the price level to compute the response of the (annualized) ten year in ‡ation and subtract the in ‡ation response from the response of the nominal long term rate to compute the response of the ex ante real rate. 9 Our assumption regarding the behavior of the long term interest rate is crucial to distinguish capital in ‡ows shocks from other shocks that generate a real appreciation and a current account de…cit. Consider a small open economy with nontraded goods and imperfect substitutability between domestic and foreign assets. An aggregate demand shock (public or private) would lead to a real appreciation (because of higher demand for nontraded goods) and a current account de…cit, but to an increase in the real interest rate. Without the restriction on the long rate, the shock could be observationally equivalent to a capital in ‡ows shock. In standard models, transitory productivity shocks generate a current account surplus because people save a large fraction of their temporary income increase. The current account behavior is inconsistent with our sign restrictions for capital in ‡ows shocks. However, a permanent increase in the total factor productivity will lead to a current account de…cit. The shock increases the marginal productivity of capital, making investment in the domestic economy more attractive. Since the increase is permanent and the consumption smoothing motive disappears, savings will not rise. Therefore, there is a net capital in ‡ow into the domestic economy and the exchange rate appreciates, just as with capital in ‡ows shocks. A permanent increase in productivity leads, however, to an increase in the domestic real interest rate because the marginal productivity of capital increases and imperfect substitutability between assets impedes exact interest rate parity. Hence, the sign restriction on the long rate allows us to distinguish a permanent productivity shock from a capital in ‡ows shock. 10 Our identi…cation restrictions for monetary policy shocks rely on a large literature surveyed in asset prices and credit with respect to the short term interest rate is especially problematic. Sign restrictions provide a means to check the robustness of these studies by using less restrictive identi…cation assumptions. In order to allow for a potential zero response of consumption, non-residential investment and prices, we impose the sign restrictions only after the …rst quarter. To account for parameter uncertainty we use an uninformative Normal-Wishart prior. We draw all parameters jointly from the posterior (including the coe¢ cients on the interaction terms). We start from the recursive model (2) it;k also depends on mortgage market characteristics, whereas starting from the reduced form speci…cation implies a constant covariance matrix. 12 For a given parameter draw, we then account for identi…cation uncertainty and compute the set of B matrices that satis…es the sign restrictions. LetB d be an orthogonal factorization, e.g. the Choleski decomposition, of the posterior draw of the covariance matrix d ; withB dB
Inference
Following Rubio-Ramirez, Waggoner, and Zha (2009) we compute Q by drawing an independent standard normalmatrix X and apply the QR decomposition X = QR: We keep the draw if B d generates impulse responses that satisfy the sign restrictions for both shocks. For a given parameter draw, we repeatedly draw Q until we have found 100 matrices that satisfy the sign restrictions. We save the point wise median and 16th and 84th percentiles of the impulse response distribution generated by accepted matrices B d :
We repeat this exercise for 100 parameter draws and save median, upper, and lower percentile for each parameter draw. This gives us 100 di¤erent estimates of the median, the lower, and the upper percentile. The …rst statistic focuses on the distribution of all medians. We report the median of all medians and, as error bands, the 16th and 84th percentile of the distribution. In this case the error bands account for parameter uncertainty and re ‡ect the uncertainty about the true median that comes from limited sample size. As a second statistic we report the median of the lower and upper percentile across all parameter draws. In this case the error bands re ‡ect identi…cation uncertainty.
In comparison to our approach, error bands reported in Uhlig (2005) re ‡ect both parameter and identi…cation uncertainty. Separating identi…cation and parameter uncertainty can provide useful additional information. The type of uncertainty that should be taken under consideration in constructing error bands depends on the question being asked. If the question is whether we can con…dently say that the response of house prices to a capital in ‡ows shocks is positive, we should account for both parameter and identi…cation uncertainty. We have to consider both the fact that we have only a limited amount of data (which leads to parameter uncertainty) and limited information on the properties of the structural shocks (which leads to identi…cation uncertainty). But if the question is whether impulse responses di¤er between countries with high and low mortgage market development, we should focus on parameter uncertainty. This is because structural mortgage market 1 2 In principle, the posterior of reduced form A it;k and it will depend on the ordering of the variables in the recursive VAR. Our speci…cation orders world output and prices …rst, followed by domestic variables ordered as in the data section. A related issue arises in a stochastically time-varying structural VAR as discussed in Primiceri (2005) . Primiceri notes that the problem could be resolved by estimating the model with several orderings. We have experimented with this and our results were not quantitatively sensitive to the ordering. Even a model that starts from the reduced form speci…cation and keeps the covariance matrix of the forecast error constant gave very similar results. Identi…cation based on sign restrictions that cover multiple horizons is also less sensitive to the estimate of the covariance matrix than identi…cation based on short run restrictions, since the set of accepted impulse responses also depends on the autoregressive coe¢ cients. di¤erences between the two types of countries will be re ‡ected in di¤erences in parameters rather than identi…cation. We are interested whether the distribution of accepted impulse responses shifts and a central parameter of the distribution is its median. The con…dence with which we can say that the distribution of medians di¤ers between the two types of countries depends on how precise the estimates are, which relates to parameter uncertainty. When comparing medians for two types of countries, we account for potential correlation between the median estimates and compute the medians with the same parameter draws. 13 To ensure comparability of impulse responses, we normalize the size of the shocks to one standard deviation based on the corresponding covariance matrix of forecast errors. Normalizing with respect to the size of the shock seems preferable to normalizing with respect to the response of a given variable. While for monetary policy shocks normalizing with respect to the short term interest rate may seem natural -for example, a fall by 25 basis points -it is not obvious what variable should be normalized for a capital in ‡ows shock. Normalizing the size of a shock to one standard deviation is equivalent to normalizing with respect to the probability of the event, since under normality a one standard deviation shock implies that events are smaller in absolute size in 68% of the cases. This facilitates the comparison of capital in ‡ows and monetary policy shocks and the comparison across di¤erent mortgage market structures.
Note that, since our estimate of the covariance matrix varies with mortgage market characteristics, if we observe a larger increase in house prices in countries with more developed mortgage markets we cannot conclude that the structure of the mortgage market is amplifying the shocks. It may simply be the case that the one standard deviation normalization produces shocks of a larger magnitude for the group of countries with more developed mortgage markets. We therefore report also the responses of non-housing variables across groups of countries with di¤erent mortgage market structures. If the response of non-housing variables is broadly the same, we consider it more likely that we are comparing shocks of similar sizes and that di¤erences in the response of housing variables stem from an ampli…cation e¤ect.
Results
The E¤ects of Capital In ‡ows and Monetary Policy Shocks on Housing Variables
Figures 3 and 4 show the impulse response functions over 40 quarters for a one standard deviation capital in ‡ows and monetary policy shock. We plot the median (solid blue line) and the 16th and 84th percentiles that account for parameter uncertainty (dashed red lines) and identi…cation 1 3 Uhlig (2005) proposes as an alternative to the pure sign restriction approach where error bands only re ‡ect parameter uncertainty. The approach chooses the orthogonal factorization that minimizes a penalty function that penalizes wrong sign and rewards correct signs of impulse responses. To identify a unique decomposition the penalty function rewards strong responses with the correct sign more than weak responses with the correct sign. A disadvantage is that we lose the information about identi…cation uncertainty and the choice of the penalty function is arbitrary. The reward of strong responses also tends to make the selected responses larger than the median. uncertainty (dotted black lines). The grey shaded area indicates the variables and the horizon for which sign restrictions are imposed.
At the median a capital in ‡ows shock leads on impact to a current account de…cit of about 0:2% of GDP, the long rate falls by about 11 basis points and the real e¤ective exchange rate appreciates by about 0:8%. Consumption peaks at 0:2% after six quarters and non-residential rises quickly by about 0:8%. The responses of world output and world prices are of very small magnitude, in line with the relatively small size of an average OECD country. We do not discuss the response of world variables in detail, but consider them as pure controls for external events.
A capital in ‡ows shock leads to an expansion of the housing sector. There is a persistent rise in real private credit and house prices that in both cases peak after seven quarters at about 0:5% and 0:6%, before slowly reverting back to zero. The response of residential investment is quicker and more short-lived, peaking at 0:7% after two quarters. Error bands indicate that the responses for all housing sector variables are statistically signi…cant. The price level initially falls by about 0:05% before beginning to rise after about a year. The de ‡ationary pressures may arise either because a nominal appreciation lowers the domestic currency prices of imports or as a result of an in ‡ow of cheap imports. The nominal short rate falls by about the same amount as the long rate (10 basis points), keeping the term spread initially constant. The short rate then starts to rise and peaks at 8 basis points after ten quarters. The shape of the response is consistent with a central bank that reacts to the fall in prices by lowering policy interest rates and then starts raising them again as in ‡ation resumes. If we assume that central banks do not have full control over the short rate, an alternative explanation is that capital in ‡ows a¤ect the term structure at all maturities by about the same amount.
A monetary policy shock leads to a fall in the short rate by 25 basis points. The long rate falls by only 10 basis points and the term spread therefore rises. We observe a permanent increase in the price level of about 0:1%. Consumption rises to about 0:2% above trend after six quarters and falls slowly back to its long term value. The hump shaped response of consumption and its timing are consistent with previous studies that document the e¤ects of monetary policy shocks in VARs. 14 Non-residential investment increases on impact by about 0:6% and reverts back afterwards. The real exchange rate depreciates initially by about 0:4% and then appreciates slowly back to its long run value with a slight delay in overshooting, which is broadly consistent with Dornbusch's overshooting model. The current account does not move, possibly because the gain in competitiveness from an exchange rate depreciation is compensated by stronger demand for imports. The shape of the response of housing variables to the monetary policy shock is similar to the capital in ‡ows shock, but the size of the response is smaller. Real credit and house prices peak at about 0:3% after ten quarters. Real residential investment peaks at 0:2%. For all three housing variables, zero lies outside the identi…cation uncertainty error bands at some point, but at short horizons the bands are wide. Mortgage market development a¤ects the transmission of monetary policy shocks: in a highly developed mortgage market the rise in real residential investment peaks at about 0:5%, compared to a zero response in a low developed market. Real house prices increase by more than 0:4% after ten quarters in a more developed market, compared to a very muted response in a less developed market. The peak response of real private credit in a highly developed market at 0:4% is about double the response in a less developed market. These di¤erences are statistically signi…cant for all three variables, but only marginally so for private credit.
The di¤erences in the responses to monetary policy shocks across the two groups of countries are concentrated on housing variables, supporting the view that the IMF index captures housingspeci…c heterogeneity. There are no signi…cant di¤erences on impact in the responses of consumption and non-residential investment, but in countries with a liberalized mortgage market the responses are somewhat more persistent (Figure 8 ). The increased persistence may arise because of secondround e¤ects from an increase in housing activity. We also do not …nd substantial di¤erences in the responses of other non-housing variables, such as interest rates or the real exchange rate, suggesting that the stronger e¤ect in a liberalized market stems from ampli…cation in the transmission of the shock rather than from a larger shock.
Capital in ‡ows shocks also have a greater e¤ect on housing variables in countries with higher mortgage market development ( Figure 5 ). The responses of real house prices and residential investment are clearly stronger and the di¤erences are statistically signi…cant. The response of real private credit has a similar magnitude in both groups of countries, but is more persistent in countries with more developed mortgage markets. Regarding the responses of non-housing variables (Figure 7 ), we observe a stronger response of consumption in countries with more developed mortgage markets, possibly because of a wealth e¤ect through higher house prices. As for monetary policy shocks, the response of non-residential investment is more persistent in countries with more developed mortgage markets, but there are no di¤erences at short horizons. There are also no notable di¤erences in the responses of other non-housing variables. Table 4 shows that the share of the forecast error variance of the three housing variables that can be explained by monetary and capital in ‡ows shocks tends to be slightly higher in the group of countries with a more developed mortgage market.
Our results indicate that capital ‡ows and monetary policy shocks have a stronger e¤ect on housing variables in more developed mortgage markets and are consistent with a role for the …nancial accelerator. In highly developed mortgage markets households can pledge a larger fraction of their house as collateral, which results in higher leverage. If households are highly indebted, they are more sensitive to changes in interest rates because small changes in rates can have a large e¤ect on their ability to service the debt. As a result, housing demand becomes more sensitive to interest rates. The amplifying e¤ect of mortgage-backed securities on housing variables is also re ‡ected in the forecast error variance decomposition, reported in Table 4 . Capital in ‡ows shocks explain about 17% of the variation in real credit at the ten year horizon in countries with high levels of securitization, compared to about 11% in countries with low levels of securitization. For real house prices, the fraction is 17% in high securitization countries versus 10% in low securitization countries.
The Role of Securitization and Time-varying Financial Structure
For real residential investment the fraction is 17% versus 9%.
Securitization also ampli…es monetary policy shocks, but to a smaller degree. In countries with a high MBS index the e¤ect of monetary policy shocks on real residential investment peaks at 0:4% compared with 0:2% in countries with a low MBS index. The peak responses of house prices is about 0:1% higher in countries where mortgage-backed securitization is more prevalent. Both di¤erences are statistically signi…cant, but only for a short horizon. There is no notable di¤erence in the response of credit.
In terms of forecast error variance decompositions, reported in Table 4 , there is no evidence that the contribution of monetary policy shocks is larger in countries that have mortgage-backed securities. The fraction of the variance in the housing variables explained by monetary policy shocks is even somewhat smaller in countries with high prevalence of MBS. In countries with high levels of securitization monetary policy shocks explain between 4% and 5% of the variation in credit, house prices and residential investment at long horizons. This compares with fractions between 6% and 9% in countries with low levels of securitization.
The …nding that securitization ampli…es the e¤ects of both shocks is again consistent with the presence of a …nancial accelerator mechanism. If we assume that securitization increases the e¢ ciency of the …nancial system and allows households to be more leveraged, the e¤ect of interest rate changes on the housing market should increase. The results are also consistent with the argument in Rajan (2005) that securitization allowed banks to take more risk and made them more sensitive to changes in interest rates. It does not automatically follow from these explanations that the ampli…cation e¤ect of securitization should be stronger for capital in ‡ows shocks than for monetary policy shocks. One reason for this, suggested by Diamond and Rajan (2009) , is that securitization allows international investors to invest directly in mortgage debt. Securitization packages mortgages together and slices them in di¤erent levels of risk. The riskiest tranches can be bought by investors with higher risk appetite, while the AAA tranches can be sold to international investors who look for safe assets. In this way, securitization increases the share of foreign capital in ‡ows allocated to home mortgage loans, amplifying the e¤ects of capital in ‡ows on the domestic housing market. Figures 11 and 12 report the di¤erences in the responses of non-housing variables. The response of consumption to a capital in ‡ows shock is about 0:15% stronger in countries with high levels of securitization, again consistent with a wealth e¤ect through higher house prices. The rise in nonresidential investment is somewhat smaller on impact in securitized countries, but is more persistent.
There are also some di¤erences in the response of the other variables. For example, the reaction of the current account and the long term interest rate is stronger and more persistent in securitized countries. This may indicate that part of the stronger response of housing variables comes from a change in the response of these other variables. For monetary policy shocks, however, the responses of non-housing variables is similar in countries with high and low securitization.
Robustness
Changes in the Sample Period
A major limitation of the index of mortgage market development constructed in IMF (2008) is that it does not vary over time. In Anglo-Saxon and Nordic countries deregulation of mortgage markets was relatively rapid and largely completed by the mid-1980s. Because our sample starts in 1984, it would capture the period post-deregulation in these countries. However, in Japan and continental Europe the process was more gradual.
To check whether our results are a¤ected by structural changes in the degree of mortgage market regulation, we estimate the model restricting sample to the period from 1990Q1 to 2006Q4. Table 5 reports the responses in countries with high and low mortgage market development at the one-year and three-years horizons, together with 16th and 84th percentiles. For comparison, the baseline results for the period from 1984Q1 to 2006Q4 are also reported.
The results for the restricted time period are qualitatively similar but less precise than the baseline results. The reduction in precision is probably due to a smaller number of observations.
As before, the responses of the housing variables to both shocks tend to be stronger in countries with a high degree of mortgage market development.
Alternative Sample-splitting Criteria
For further robustness, we also report results for three alternative sample splitting criteria: the ratio of mortgage debt to GDP listed in Calza et al. (2009) , the possibility of mortgage equity withdrawal, and the typical loan-to-value ratio. Again, only time-invariant (cross-sectional) information is available for these measures.
The results, reported in Table 6 suggest that housing variables respond more strongly to both shocks in countries that have a higher mortgage to GDP ratio. In all cases the di¤erences have the expected sign and are statistically signi…cant at least at one of the horizons in …ve out of six cases.
In countries that allow for mortgage equity withdrawal all three housing variables respond more strongly to monetary policy and capital in ‡ows shocks. Except for the response of private credit to a capital in ‡ows shock, the di¤erence is signi…cant at one-year or three-years horizons. When we split the sample according to typical loan-to-value ratio, the di¤erences have again the expected sign, but tend to be insigni…cant.
Monetary Unions and Exchange Rate Regimes
The introduction of the Euro in 1999 and the loss of monetary policy independence by its adopters creates two potential problems for our methodology. The …rst problem concerns the correct identi…cation of the shocks: part of the identi…ed unexpected movements in interest rates may be forecastable if one accounts for Euro Area fundamentals and are only surprising from a single country's perspective. The second problem concerns the transmission of the shocks, which may be a¤ected by changes in exchange rate regimes (for example, moving from a ‡oating to a …xed exchange rate).
One way to adapt our framework to take into account the adoption of the Euro would be to look at a Euro Area aggregate rather than at individual member countries. We see some important drawbacks with that approach. First, before 1999 member countries had autonomy in the conduct of monetary policy and aggregation would neglect this fact. Second, our analysis has revealed important heterogeneity in the transmission of shocks to the housing sector and aggregation would eliminate this heterogeneity.
Because of these drawbacks with aggregation, we follow previous studies that investigate the transmission of monetary policy shocks -Assenmacher-Wesche and Gerlach (2010), Calza et al.
(2009) and Goodhart and Ho¤mann (2008) -and treat each country as a separate cross-sectional unit. In contrast to these studies, however, our model controls for movements in output and prices in the country's trading partners, often other Euro members. This should help with the identi…cation of monetary policy shocks. In addition, we identify monetary policy shocks using sign restrictions, an approach that is less vulnerable to omitted variable bias than a recursive scheme, since it pins down the sign of the responses of important macroeconomic variables.
To address the second problem -the possibility that the adoption of the Euro may have a¤ected the transmission of shocks -we augment the model by including an exchange rate regime variable as an additional interaction term. The exchange rate regime is captured by an indicator variable that takes a value of one for a peg and zero otherwise and is constructed using the IMF's de jure classi…cation. Table 7 reports the impulse responses evaluated at a value zero for the indicator variable, i.e., for countries without a peg. 15 Our main results hold both for the IMF index of mortgage market development and for the securitization index. This suggests that our main conclusions still hold in countries without a peg when we control for the exchange rate regime.
Conclusion
In this study we examine three di¤erent explanations for housing sector booms: monetary policy, capital in ‡ows and …nancial innovation. We estimate a panel VAR model and identify monetary policy and capital in ‡ows shocks using sign restrictions. To assess whether the structure of the mortgage market a¤ects the transmission of macroeconomic shocks to the housing sector we split the sample into countries with high and low mortgage market development. We also adapt the model to allow the coe¢ cients in the VAR to vary with the degree of securitization.
We …nd that both capital in ‡ows and monetary policy shocks have a signi…cant and positive e¤ect on real house prices, real credit to the private sector and real residential investment. Housing variables respond more strongly to both shocks in countries with a more developed mortgage market and in countries where securitization is more prevalent. This is consistent with the presence of a …nancial accelerator mechanism. In highly developed mortgage markets households can pledge a larger fraction of their house as collateral, which results in higher leverage. If households are highly indebted, they are more sensitive to changes in the value of collateral. We …nd that the propagation e¤ect of securitization is stronger for capital in ‡ows than for monetary policy shocks.
The response of housing variables to capital in ‡ows shocks is larger and longer lasting in countries where securitization is allowed. A potential explanation is that mortgage-backed securitization transforms illiquid, low-grade loans into publicly traded assets of higher quality which are attractive to international investors. In this way, securitization increases the share of foreign capital in ‡ows allocated to home mortgage loans, amplifying the e¤ects of capital in ‡ows on the domestic housing market.
The run-up to the present crisis was characterized by a housing boom in most OECD countries.
Our results suggest that capital in ‡ows coupled with innovations in the mortgage market played an important role in the housing boom. This implies that countries with more developed mortgage markets and a high degree of securitization should be wary of large external imbalances and work towards their reduction. At the same time, improved …nancial regulation would help reduce the e¤ect of capital in ‡ows on asset prices. 
